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Introduction
Health care reform is high on the agenda of poli-
cymakers at both the state and federal levels. The 
individual insurance market is central to many pro-
posals, including some under discussion as well as 
some in early implementation. In 2006 Massachusetts 
enacted an ambitious reform plan that requires all 
adults in the state to purchase coverage; the idea of 
an individual mandate is also part of some federal 
proposals. Various federal proposals include substan-
tial tax deductions or tax credits for those purchasing 
health insurance in the individual market. Both would 
eliminate the favorable tax treatment that employer-
sponsored coverage currently enjoys relative to most 
individual coverage. 
While these developments envision a larger, more promi-
nent role for the individual market, considerable disagree-
ment remains about the current state of this market and 
its potential as a vehicle to significantly expand coverage. 
Some elements of the current ideas for reform—such as 
an individual mandate—are new and untested, and the 
dynamics of insurance markets that both inspired and 
bedeviled reform efforts in the 1990s—such as managing 
adverse selection when individuals have a choice of prod-
ucts and carriers—may remain even in a reformed market. 
Insights gained from prior research and reform efforts 
may offer valuable lessons as policymakers consider the 
current crop of proposals, raising flags for issues likely 
to resurface and providing guidance for how unintended 
consequences might be mitigated.   
This synthesis focuses on a group of projects explor-
ing various aspects of the individual insurance market 
funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 
Changes in Health Care Financing and Organization 
(HCFO) initiative throughout the past decade.1  
These projects vary broadly in scope and method. 
They cover a wide array of topics, including studies 
of the participants in and dynamics of the individual 
market, evaluations of state attempts to stabilize the 
individual market, early experience with a health insur-
ance tax credit, and lessons that might be learned 
from Association Health Plans (AHPs), which have 
many similarities to the individual insurance market.  
Methodologically, the projects range from a theory-
based exploration of guaranteed renewability to sev-
eral qualitative studies (see Table 1: HCFO Projects 
Addressing the Individual Insurance Market).  
The approach and findings of each project, including 
lessons that might be usefully applied in formulating 
and analyzing current reform proposals, are discussed.  
While the research included in this synthesis is not 
comprehensive, the breadth and depth of the work, 
as well as sufficient commonality among the findings, 
permit the development of lessons from experience 
with the existing individual insurance market, as well 
as a framework for evaluating future policy proposals 
supporting its expansion. 
What Distinguishes the Current 
Individual Market, and How Might  
It Change?
Dynamics of Individual Coverage
We have long understood that the individual market is 
quite small, and data from surveys such as the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) suggest that it is a transitory 
market for at least some of its participants (Chollet, 
2000). Andrew Coburn and colleagues (Ziller et al., 
2004) extend our understanding of market dynamics 
using panel data. They use data from the 1996-2000 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
to examine the length of spells of individual coverage 
and to look at insurance status before and following 
those periods in the individual market. They find that 
most purchasers use individual coverage as a bridge 
between spells of employer coverage—two-thirds of 
spells began or ended with employer coverage, and 58 
percent both began and ended that way. This find-
ing confirms the dynamic hinted at in cross-sectional 
CPS data, where Chollet (2000) found that a third of 
respondents reporting individual coverage in a year 
also reported having employer-based coverage at some 
point during the same time period.  
Coburn and colleagues use the longitudinal nature of 
the SIPP data to offer insights about how spells of 
individual insurance end. They find striking differences 
between subgroups: Among the very young (18-24 
years old), 40 percent of individually insured spells 
transition to uninsured, compared with 6 percent 
among those age 55 to 65.  Similarly, among those 
in excellent or good health, 17 percent of those with 
individual insurance end up uninsured, while only 9 
percent of those in fair or poor health do. The much 
greater willingness by the young and healthy to drop 
coverage suggests that there is a basis to insurers’ fears 
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about the vulnerability of this market to adverse 
selection (or adverse retention, in this instance). 
The young and healthy are more likely to end an 
individual insurance spell uninsured, while older 
and sicker persons are much more likely to end 
an individual insurance spell by entering public 
insurance (Medicare or Medicaid). One-fourth of 
55- to 64-year-olds and nearly 40 percent of those 
reporting fair or poor health transitioned from 
individual to public coverage.  
Not only did individual market participants 
tend to shift to other insurance states during 
the observation period, but their stays in this 
market were quite short—the median length of 
new spells of individual coverage was just eight 
months. Almost half of those spells were six 
months or shorter, and two-thirds of new spells 
were shorter than one year.  
Coburn’s work confirms prior studies that the 
individual market in its current state is a residual 
market, where individual coverage serves as a 
bridge between other insured states, and a brief 
one at that. Policy changes such as equalized 
tax treatment or an individual mandate might 
make this market both larger and a longer-term 
source of coverage for participants, and Coburn’s 
work suggests that such a market might look 
and function very differently from non-group 
markets today. At a minimum, it would be larger 
and potentially have more permanent and semi-
permanent inhabitants. But how many more 
consumers would be enticed into the market and 
how long they would stay would continue to 
depend on the range of products and prices they 
are offered. Those issues are the focus of the next 
set of projects discussed.
What Makes the Individual Market 
Different?
Mark Hall conducted a series of case studies of 
states using field studies and extensive interviews 
with insurance agents, health insurers, and regula-
tors. One recurrent theme in his work is the need 
to understand the fundamental characteristics 
of the individual market that make it unique. A 
second theme concerns the boundaries between 
markets and the disruptions that can occur when 
those boundaries are crossed or ignored.  
Hall identifies a number of problems in the indi-
vidual market, including the fact that insurers 
underwrite aggressively; products carry high 
administrative loads; and markets are thin and 
volatile, with little competition. These problems 
exist across the span of regulatory environments, 
they are not easily solved, and policy alterna-
tives such as purchasing cooperatives and market 
reforms are not “magic wands” to create group-
like efficiencies and more competitive, accessible 
markets (Hall, 2002). 
Most states’ individual markets lack competition; 
one or a few competitors—frequently a Blue 
Cross Blue Shield plan—hold overwhelming mar-
ket share. Hall describes a self-perpetuating cycle 
of highly concentrated markets in which insur-
ance agents are reluctant to sell the policies of 
companies with small market share for fear that 
these companies will exit the market and strand 
their customers, and those insurers frequently 
wind up exiting the market due to low volume  
of sales.    
Hall expands upon this idea of distinct markets 
with very different dynamics in an article on what 
he terms the “geography” of health insurance 
(2000). He argues that the large-group, small-
group, and non-group markets are fundamentally 
different markets, with different products, differ-
ent sales channels, different companies, and very 
different regulatory environments. Many of the 
differences are due to underlying differences in 
the markets, and Hall argues that policymakers 
should be careful about assuming that the indi-
vidual market, however large, is capable of acquir-
ing the characteristics of the large-group market.
In the non-group market, the individual chooses 
whether and when to purchase insurance, how 
much coverage, and for how long. The indi-
vidual knows, and may take into account, tastes 
for medical care, non-obvious underlying health 
conditions, and anticipated needs (e.g., plans for 
a pregnancy), whereas the benefits manager at a 
large company is unlikely either to know or care 
about such particulars when purchasing insurance 
for the group. Insurers are acutely aware of this 
difference in markets and use underwriting and 
marketing as best they can to avoid attracting 
only the “hand raisers” among potential purchas-
ers. While subsidies administered through the 
tax code as either credits or deductions may lure 
additional healthy lives into the market, individu-
als still would tailor their insurance purchases to 
their own needs given the opportunity to do so.  
In the non-group market, individuals see and pay 
the “sticker price” for their insurance, and so are 
much more likely to be price-aware. In the group 
market, not only is coverage generally subsidized 
by the employer, but the employee has only a 
vague awareness of how much insurance is cost-
ing them. And although an economist would 
argue that the employer’s subsidy is not “free” 
since it represents foregone wages, that is not the 
general perception (Pauly, 1999). 
In addition, workers do not take or leave jobs solely 
on the basis of the implicit cost of a health insurance 
benefit. Although awareness and transparency in 
pricing is a good thing in general, when coupled with 
the individual knowledge and mobility described 
above, they can amplify rapid sorting of risk and 
instability in the market. Whereas young, healthy 
employees in a company may be only dimly aware 
that they are subsidizing older, sicker co-workers, 
a young and healthy individual in the non-group 
market is more sensitive to the price of risk pool-
ing, both because they are paying the full cost, and 
because their insurer or a competitor insurer will 
be quick to point out a more affordable product 
if they can be re-underwritten. While tax subsidies 
could dampen this price sensitivity, individuals would 
still be acutely aware of the price they could pay 
elsewhere. As Hall puts it, “Large employer groups 
are stable and have low overhead costs, not simply 
because they are large, but also because the employer 
selects and pays for the insurance.”  
Given this combination of mobility and price-
sensitivity, what Hall terms gradients between 
markets can translate to large and rapid market 
shifts if insurers and purchasers are able to 
exploit breaches in the walls that separate mar-
kets. Examples of such breaches include the 
association plans that sprang up in Kentucky fol-
lowing that state’s reform effort, the use of group 
trust arrangements in various states that insurers 
use to circumvent individual market rules, and the 
flight of eligible individuals from the non-group 
to the employer markets in New Jersey (Kirk, 
2000; Monheit et al., 2004).  
Lessons from Association Health 
Plans 
Some policymakers propose greater use of AHPs 
as a vehicle to offer the benefits of group cover-
age to individual purchasers. AHPs are group 
health plans sponsored by trade, industry, profes-
sional, chamber of commerce, or similar business 
associations. They are also sometimes organized 
around associations formed by insurers them-
selves. AHPs share many characteristics with the 
individual market, including the increased price 
awareness and mobility of individual purchasers. 
Because many states exempt national associations 
from all or some regulations regarding product 
and rate filings, AHPs raise exactly the sort of 
boundary issues identified by Hall as an impor-
tant source of instability in the individual market.  
To a large extent the states regulate individual 
and small-group health insurance, but AHPs 
operate across state lines and, even within states, 
typically operate outside the reach of individual or 
small-group regulation. Federal proposals to relax 
state regulations regarding AHPs are introduced 
in Congress perennially, despite the misgivings 
of state insurance regulators and others. Other 
reform proposals include the concept of multi-
state products. 
Kofman and colleagues examined the AHP regula-
tions and practices currently in place (Kofman et 
al., 2006). Their conclusions serve as a cautionary 
note to those who would expand AHPs with the 
intention of improving how these markets function.  
Kofman explains that if individuals residing in a 
state where associations are exempt from regulation 
purchase coverage through an AHP, regulation falls 
to the state where the master contract is issued—
typically a state that lightly regulates such plans. 
Given that funding constraints may make it difficult 
for state regulators to assist their own residents, out-
of-state residents may have no effective regulatory 
recourse. Similarly, regulators in the state of an indi-
vidual’s residence may find themselves adjudicating 
problems that were not of their making. This may be 
of particular concern in instances where the associa-
tion was established explicitly to avoid regulatory 
oversight.  
The concerns that Kofman has raised—as well as 
the market boundary issues raised by Hall and the 
experiences of New Jersey, Kentucky, and oth-
ers—point to the importance of formulating fed-
eral policy with a view to avoiding the creation of 
additional market boundary issues. For example, 
if tax laws are changed to offer tax credits or tax 
deductions for individual insurance, policymakers 
should give careful thought to defining what sorts 
of policies would qualify for the favorable tax 
treatment—not only in terms of scope of ben-
efits, but also with regard to the regulatory status 
of the policy in the purchaser’s state of residence. 
Kofman and colleagues cite the experience 
with Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements 
(MEWAs) as a cautionary tale for federal 
policymakers contemplating federal laws that 
would ease restrictions on AHPs. Although 
the Department of Labor (DOL) now has the 
authority to require MEWAs to register with 
them, Kofman identifies various weaknesses in 
that system. These include a percentage of clearly 
faulty registrations (with missing or inaccurate 
information), evidence that MEWAs are operat-
ing in some states illegally, and failure by the 
DOL to exercise its authority in levying fines for 
incomplete or inaccurate filings. DOL estimates 
that fewer than half of existing MEWAs are reg-
istered with them as required. Kofman cautions 
that Congress should review the case of MEWA 
regulation very carefully before concluding that 
more regulatory authority of AHPs should be 
transferred from the states to the federal level via 
federal initiatives, such as the creation of multi-
state individual products. 
Kofman and colleagues also review the conten-
tion that AHPs provide large associations with 
negotiating clout and thus lower prices. Like Hall, 
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Lessons Learned
The Current Individual Insurance 
Market
•	 The	current	individual	market	is	a	residual	
market, where individual coverage 
generally serves as a bridge between 
other insured states.
•		How	many	more	consumers	would	be	
enticed into the market and how long 
they would stay would depend on the 
range of products and prices they face.
•		The	large-group,	small-group,	and	non-
group markets are fundamentally different 
markets, with different products, different 
sales channels, different companies, and 
very different regulatory environments.
•		Increased	price-sensitivity	and	mobility	in	
the individual market can lead to market 
instability.
•		No	matter	how	large	it	grows,	the	
individual market is unlikely to acquire the 
characteristics of the large-group market. 
•		An	individual	mandate	may	result	in	
an influx of lower-risk individuals into 
the individual insurance market, but if 
enrollees are offered lower-cost coverage 
in the group market, they are likely to take 
it, potentially affecting the stability of the 
market.
•		Lower	prices	in	the	individual	market,	
when present, are more likely the result of 
risk segmentation than low administrative 
costs.  
•		Preemptive,	defensive	pricing	in	the	
individual market can turn insurers’ fears 
of adverse selection into self-fulfilling 
prophecies, since high rates deter all but the 
sickest from enrolling.
Lessons from Reform Efforts
•		Consumers	and	insurers	respond	to	the	
incentives established through reform, 
both those that are intended and those 
that are not.
•		It	is	important	to	formulate	state	and	
federal health insurance market policy 
in ways that do not exacerbate the 
sometimes shaky relationships at the 
intersection of the individual, small-group, 
and large-group markets.
•		Federal	policy	must	consider	market	
boundary issues and define what sorts 
of policies would qualify for the favorable 
tax treatment—not only in terms of scope 
of benefits, but also with regard to the 
regulatory status of the policy in the 
purchaser’s state of residence.
•	 In	a	larger	market	with	more	permanent	
policyholders, consumers might be 
willing to pay some additional cost for 
the smoothing effect on premiums that 
guaranteed renewal provides. However, 
this is contingent on insurers honoring 
their commitment to provide long-term 
coverage. 
•		When	implementing	tax	credits,	especially	
for an economically stressed population, 
insufficient subsidy and a delay in 
implementation or uncertainty about the 
program can result in low participation.
•		High-cost	individuals	affect	the	behavior	
and stability of the individual insurance 
market, which must be anticipated when 
considering policies that would expand 
the market. 
Kofman asserts that lower prices in the individual 
market, when observed, are more likely the result 
of risk segmentation than low administrative 
costs. She points out that association plans are 
subject to the same selection into and out of 
coverage, with the same defensive responses of 
insurers to the prospect of adverse selection, and 
the same administrative inefficiencies of individu-
al transactions:  “…in the insurance context, large 
does not always equate with negotiating power to 
obtain better rates and benefits.”  
Efforts to Reform and Stabilize 
Individual Insurance Markets
Potential and Current Role of 
Guaranteed Renewal
Guaranteed renewability assures a policyholder 
that the policy will not be cancelled at the end 
of the contract period. The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) requires most health insurance policies 
to be guaranteed renewable. Many, although not 
all, states also prohibit carriers from re-underwrit-
ing coverage at renewal; therefore, rate increases 
reflect the cost experience of, at a minimum, the 
policyholder’s rate class, not the policyholder’s 
own claims experience. Two HCFO researchers 
examined the role of guaranteed renewal (GR) 
in stabilizing the individual market. In his study 
of various state insurance markets, Mark Hall 
concludes that GR, as currently formulated, is 
inadequate to protect consumers (Hall, 2002). 
Mark Pauly and Bradley Herring examined the 
theoretical role of guaranteed renewal policies in 
the individual market and explored the degree 
to which the theoretical premium path for guar-
anteed renewable policies matches that of actual 
premiums (Herring and Pauly, 2006).
Theory and Potential: In a guaranteed renewal market, 
insurers might, in theory, charge some additional 
premium each year, “front-loading” the premium in 
anticipation of rising loss experience. Front-loading 
provides an incentive for healthy policyholders to 
renew in the out years, since they have already paid 
for the guaranteed renewable aspect of the policy. 
But individual health insurance might deviate from 
such theoretical predictions for at least two rea-
sons: 1) young purchasers might be unwilling to 
purchase a policy with the GR part of the premium 
front-loaded; and 2) the GR provision might not be 
considered valuable by consumers if insurers aren’t 
trusted to honor the commitment, e.g., by “churn-
ing” health risk to isolate sicker blocks of business. 
Pauly and Herring used expenditure data to establish 
a theoretically optimal premium path for a GR  
policy that would extend from young adulthood to 
age 64. They find that two factors would reduce the 
amount of front-loading in the optimal policy:  
1) some of the individuals who become sick early in 
the life of the policy die or recover; and 2) most poli-
cyholders who become unhealthy do so in the later 
years of the policy after paying premiums for many 
low-cost years.  
Pauly and Herring then compare this optimal pre-
mium path with actual individual market premiums, 
as reported by respondents to the Community 
Tracking Survey (CTS).  They find that the optimal 
GR premium path matches the actual premium path 
more closely than do the premium paths based on 
risk rating alone or age-based rating.  
It is curious that the optimum path matches up 
with current market premiums so closely, and 
may speak to the validity of presumptions about 
consumers’ ability to shape the insurance markets 
in which they buy coverage. Current enrollees 
appear to pay premiums that approximate an 
optimal premium for a long-duration GR policy. 
But the work of Coburn and others suggests 
a current market characterized by short stays, 
including some unknown portion covered by 
short-term or bridge policies that do not include 
a GR commitment. In effect, these and other 
policyholders who stayed in the market for only 
a short time paid a GR premium without ever 
reaping its benefits. Thus, it is not clear what cur-
rent consumers are getting for the risk premium 
they, theoretically, would pay for long-duration 
GR. One possibility is that they are sufficiently 
risk-averse to pay high premiums, including an 
unmeasured but in fact sizeable increment for 
GR, even if they do not anticipate staying in the 
market for a protracted period of time. 
The Pauly and Herring results also have interesting 
implications for a future market characterized by 
the sort of college-to-retirement premium duration 
that they modeled. In a larger market with more 
permanent policyholders, this work suggests that 
consumers are willing to pay some additional cost 
for the smoothing effect on premiums that GR 
provides. However, the value of GR to consum-
ers is contingent on insurers honoring their com-
mitment to GR, and eschewing practices such as 
durational rating and closed blocks to subvert that 
promise. Although there are anecdotal accounts of 
such insurer practices, Pauly and Patel point out 
that we do not know how prevalent they may be 
(Patel and Pauly, 2002).  
Current Thinking about Guaranteed Renewal: Hall points 
out that the fear of carrier exits—either closing 
policies or leaving the market entirely—underlies a 
fundamental weakness with GR of policies. While 
Pauly and colleagues argue that GR is a valuable 
risk-stabilizing device in the non-group market that 
purchasers would seek out and pay a premium for 
(Herring and Pauly, 2006; Patel and Pauly, 2002), 
Hall argues that as currently formulated, GR is 
inadequate to protect consumers. First, it does not 
protect individuals when a carrier exits the market 
or closes the policy. While evidence suggests that 
carriers rarely exit, closed blocks of business (where 
old policies are renewed but not actively sold) are 
inherently unpleasant places to be for individuals in 
poor health; the closed block tends to enter a spiral 
of adverse retention as healthier risks leave the policy 
for freshly underwritten policies elsewhere. Although 
renewed individuals may not be re-underwritten (so 
that their rates are not raised based on their indi-
vidual experience), this may be moot when all of the 
individuals remaining in a block of business are in 
poor health, and the insurer can justifiably impose 
large rate increases based on the experience of the 
block of business.  
This raises a second weakness of GR that Hall notes: 
Guaranteed renewal neither permits individuals to 
switch carriers nor to switch among plans offered by 
the same carrier. On the one hand, there are valid 
reasons to permit insurers to protect themselves 
against individuals who purchase a bare-bones policy 
until they get sick, then switch to a more compre-
hensive policy. On the other hand, the narrow form 
of GR that currently prevails leaves open the pos-
sibility of insurers sorting and re-sorting blocks of 
business based on risk, unless state regulators care-
fully monitor market conduct and rates for closed 
blocks of business.  
Hall argues that stronger guaranteed renew-
ability protections would make consumers more 
comfortable buying products from new market 
entrants and smaller companies.  
Premium Subsidies via Tax 
Credits: The Case of the HCTC
Tax credits for the purchase of health insurance 
are one way to extend subsidies for coverage to 
individuals without access to employer-sponsored 
coverage, and to eliminate the difference in tax 
treatment between employer-sponsored and 
individual coverage. The experience of a small 
program provides some insights into the opportuni-
ties and challenges that this strategy might pres-
ent, especially if overlaid on existing individual 
5
insurance markets. Congress enacted the Health 
Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) as part of the 2002 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act. The 
HCTC provides a premium subsidy to workers in 
jobs affected by international trade, certain early 
retirees, and dependents of both groups. Subsidies 
were provided as advance-payment tax credits.  
Pollitz evaluated the results of the HCTC, inter-
viewing state and federal officials and insurers and 
reviewing the regulatory record.  She finds that only 
7 to 21 percent of eligible individuals participated 
in the HCTC, and points to a number of factors 
that might explain such low take-up (Pollitz, 2007). 
Although the program provides a 65 percent pre-
mium subsidy, even the 35 percent share required of 
participants may have been unaffordable given that 
many were unemployed or otherwise had limited 
incomes. Participants can only claim subsidies up to 
the amount of taxes paid, further limiting the value 
of the subsidy for low- to middle-income individuals. 
The program placed no limit on premiums charged, 
and because many states used high-risk pools or 
other insurer-of-last-resort mechanisms to provide 
coverage, premiums could be very high, especially 
for older or higher risk individuals. High-risk pool 
premiums for a 60-year-old male range from $334 
per month in Maryland to $2,221 per month in 
Louisiana. North Carolina’s designated carrier 
imposed rates of more than $9,000 a month for a 
55-year-old high-risk applicant—up to seven times 
that of a preferred risk applicant.  
The HCTC subsidy was payable on a monthly basis, 
but Pollitz identified delays in initial payments of 
over three months as another factor discouraging 
enrollment. Enrolling in the program was complex, 
frequently requiring multiple contacts with federal 
and state agencies as well as with private insurers. 
Finally, she reported high administrative costs at all 
levels, from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to 
the private insurers participating. In 2004, the IRS 
alone spent one dollar in administrative costs for 
every two dollars in subsidies paid. In 2006 that fig-
ure dropped to one dollar for every four dollars paid, 
but administrative reductions were achieved, in part, 
by reducing outreach efforts.  
Although the HCTC was a limited program tar-
geted to a narrow group, it represents a first effort 
to implement federal tax credits for health insur-
ance, and thus holds important lessons for those 
contemplating federal premium subsidies on a larger 
scale. Pollitz argues that insufficient subsidies for an 
economically stressed population were one major 
reason for low participation—a problem exacerbated 
by high premiums. As with HIPAA, the HCTC 
created a right to coverage for a class of individuals, 
but remained silent on the issue of cost, leaving it to 
the states to decide how affordable coverage should 
be. Some states subsidize their high-risk pools much 
more heavily than others; other states, such as North 
Carolina, impose no premium restrictions on their 
designated carriers of last resort. Pollitz also points 
to evidence suggesting that many participants were 
charged premiums much higher than warranted by 
their subsequent claims experience. Such preemptive, 
defensive pricing can turn insurers’ fears of adverse 
selection into self-fulfilling prophecies, since high 
rates deter all but the sickest from enrolling. In this 
case, subsidies appeared to buffer that effect; the 
federal government picked up 65 percent of the pre-
mium cost, suggesting that subsidies can dampen the 
volatility of individual markets. But this result came 
at a high cost to the taxpayer and the policyholder, 
who in addition to covering high administrative 
costs may also have paid actuarially unfair premiums. 
Finally, Pollitz argues that most of the administra-
tive costs were attributable to the one-on-one, retail 
nature of the transactions; these are unlikely to disap-
pear or even diminish with a larger program.  
Comprehensive State Reform
In the mid-1990s, New Jersey implemented an 
innovative set of reforms designed to stabilize the 
individual market. The reforms were prompted 
by the financial difficulties of the Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield plan, which served as the state’s 
insurer of last resort in the individual market. 
The Individual Health Coverage Program (IHCP) 
was designed to encourage insurers to participate 
in the market and to share the cost of market 
losses among all insurers through a “pay-or-play” 
mechanism that requires insurers not participat-
ing in the individual market to help cover the 
losses of insurers that do. Other reforms included 
guaranteed issue of individual coverage, modified 
community rating, and standardization of plans.2
Swartz and Garnick conducted an early evaluation 
of the New Jersey reforms (Garnick and Swartz, 
1999), which anticipated many of the results of a 
later examination by Cantor and colleagues (2004). 
Swartz and Garnick’s analyses provide insights into 
how small insurers exploited opportunities in the 
risk-sharing scheme, thus setting the stage for the 
market turmoil that followed when carriers rapidly 
raised premiums above their artificially low initial 
rates. Cantor and colleagues follow the development 
of adverse selection that resulted. They find that 
although the New Jersey reforms were intended to 
enlarge and stabilize the individual market, over time 
the market nevertheless showed evidence of adverse 
selection as poorer risk remained in the market 
and lower risk exited. Cantor also observed strong 
adverse selection against particular products—specif-
ically, the most generous indemnity plan.  
The broad lesson that both sets of authors draw 
is that both consumers and insurers responded to 
incentives, whether intended or not. For example, 
small carriers initially responded to the promise 
of protection against losses by low-balling premi-
ums to attract market share. Premiums that were 
initially set unrealistically low contributed to the 
subsequent pain and upheaval of large premium 
increases. Both Swartz and Garnick and Cantor 
and colleagues agree that the carrier responses 
to the reform’s loss assessment mechanism (not 
adverse selection) caused early turmoil and a rise 
in premiums. Small carriers had nothing to lose by 
initially under-pricing their products, since their 
losses would be covered by carrier assessments. 
Consumers were also highly responsive to the 
incentives presented by the market. When group 
coverage was available, lower risk consum-
ers migrated from the individual market where 
premiums were pure community-rated to the 
small-employer market where age bands were per-
mitted. Thus differential rules in the non-group 
and small-group markets may have exacerbated 
adverse selection in the non-group market—
another example of Hall’s point about the role 
of regulatory walls between markets, and the 
instability that breaches in those walls can cause. 
One implication for current reform efforts is that 
an individual mandate may serve to pull low-risks 
into the insurance market as a whole, but they 
may not enter or stay in the individual market if 
they have a lower cost option in group coverage.  
The Role and Experience of High-
Cost Individuals in the Market
How much trouble do individuals have in finding 
and retaining coverage at a reasonable cost when 
they are either in poor health or considered by insur-
ers to be high-risk? As Pauly and Nichols have point-
ed out, this is an area of some disagreement among 
researchers and policy analysts (Pauly and Nichols, 
2002). Pollitz and colleagues have argued that higher 
risk consumers can face a very hostile and expensive 
marketplace, depending on the state where they live 
(e.g., the experience of some HCTC participants as 
described earlier). But Pauly and Herring found that 
premiums paid by non-group policyholders varied 
much less than their expected medical expenses, sug-
gesting that this market may spread risk more widely 
than is commonly perceived. Pauly and Herring 
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(Herring and Pauly, 2001) evaluated the degree of 
risk pooling in the individual market empirically, 
finding that premiums vary considerably less with 
risk than would be found under perfect risk rating.3 
They reported risk elasticities of 0.12-0.18 (perfect 
risk rating would imply an elasticity of 1). They con-
clude that there may be considerably more risk pool-
ing in this market than is commonly believed, and 
that high-risk individuals somehow find or renew 
coverage for much less than their expected expendi-
tures. However, while this study has the advantage 
of using actual premiums (as opposed to premium 
quotes that may never have any takers), it includes 
only individuals who are present in this market, not 
those who were rejected for coverage or who found 
coverage in the group market. In addition, it reflects 
the average experience of current individual policy-
holders (with some unknown component of renew-
als), not the experience of those seeking to enter the 
market. Finally, observed premiums do not account 
for differences in the scope of coverage, such as 
waiting periods or permanent exclusions that might 
have been imposed on higher risk policyholders.  
Pauly and Nichols suggest that some differences 
among research findings may be due to differences 
in ideological perspectives and in one’s views on 
what sorts of equity/efficiency tradeoffs might be 
acceptable. That is, to what degree should access and 
affordability by low risks be compromised to ensure 
access and affordability for high risks?   
Differences in methods may also account for 
some of the differences in conclusions. Pollitz 
and others have relied on more qualitative studies 
of consumer distress. These findings are echoed 
by anecdotal but compelling accounts in the 
popular media of the difficulties faced by some 
individuals (e.g., Pear, 2007). These methods sug-
gest that at least some high-risk individuals face 
difficulties, but do not explore the prevalence of 
difficulty. Making use of nationally representative 
survey data (CTS and MEPS), Pauly and col-
leagues attempted to address this issue, but such 
data are inherently flawed—they identify only 
individuals who have succeeded in finding or 
retaining individual coverage, not those who were 
rejected from coverage or found it either unaf-
fordable or of too little value to buy.  
In addition, price measures confound comparison 
of findings in past research. Pollitz and others used 
quoted prices for new policies. In contrast, Pauly’s 
work used premiums paid by actual policyholders, 
arguing that prices actually paid are a more reason-
able measure of the market environment than the 
range of prices quoted to a prospective policyholder. 
But as noted earlier, actual prices in survey data 
have their own biases, because they exclude some 
unknown percentage of potential purchasers who 
were dissuaded from purchasing in this market.   
Coburn and colleagues’ work also raised intrigu-
ing issues about exactly how one should interpret 
premiums paid by individual policyholders in sur-
vey data. Their results suggested that sick people 
exit the individual market sooner than those in 
better health, but the reasons are unclear—did 
they jump, or were they pushed? Their work also 
showed a higher percentage of individuals in poor 
or fair health in the individual market than in the 
CPS data—a discrepancy that may relate to the 
vagueness of self-reported-health-status measures. 
A better understanding of how much even a few 
high-cost individuals affect market behavior and 
stability would be helpful in understanding how 
public policy should anticipate supporting the cur-
rent market as well as a larger market. The skewed 
distribution of health care costs combined with most 
insurers’ very small market share explains why insur-
ers fear very high-cost cases and underwrite to avoid 
them. But would a larger market be more stable and 
able to accommodate and absorb high-risk individu-
als? Or would insurers intent on maximizing net rev-
enues continue to avoid and isolate high-cost cases, 
driving competitors to do the same?  
Applying Lessons Learned 
Existing evidence and lessons from past HCFO 
research will serve policymakers well as they 
consider ways to reform the American health 
care system, particularly as they consider propos-
als that might augment the use of the individual 
insurance market.
Conclusion
Common themes emerge from this body of 
research. Risk can shift quickly and dramatically 
in the individual market and policymakers should 
remain alert to the creation of regulatory gradi-
ents within and between markets that may set 
the stage for adverse selection. Imposing federal 
policy over state regulation of markets creates a 
similar set of challenges. The individual market 
is characterized by a series of one-on-one trans-
actions, including marketing, product selection, 
payment, and underwriting. This fundamentally 
retail nature of the market underlies both its 
vulnerability to adverse selection and its inherent 
administrative inefficiency; policymakers should 
be realistic about what administrative efficiencies 
are possible even in an expanded market.  
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Endnotes
1 For a more comprehensive review of the literature on indi-
vidual insurance markets, see Beth Fuch’s synthesis of the 
analytic literature (2004).
2 See the article by Swartz and Garnick for a more complete 
description of the rather complex pay-or-play mechanism and 
other reforms implemented in New Jersey.  
3 Herring and Pauly use expenditure data from the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to predict age and health-
adjusted expenditures for respondents reporting individual 
coverage in the Community Tracking Survey (CTS). They 
then regress premiums paid on predicted expenditures, how 
many family members the policy covers, and in some cases, 
plan characteristics.  
What Do Policymakers Need to 
Consider?
• How will the proposed policy affect the 
flow of risk from one market to another, 
and therefore the stability of every market?  
• How does the policy proposal address 
jurisdictional issues between the federal 
government and the states?  
• How might federal standards about 
products qualifying for preferential tax 
treatment interact with state oversight 
and policy regarding benefits and rating? 
• What assumptions does the proposal 
make about economies of scale and 
administrative costs in the individual 
market?  
• How might the policy change the 
dynamics and demographics of 
the individual market? In particular, 
what would be its effect on high-risk 
individuals?  
•		 If a proposal (e.g., an individual mandate 
or individual subsidies) is expected to 
add lives to the individual market, how 
would new purchasers resemble or differ 
from current purchasers, and how would 
insurers respond to initial uncertainty if 
not also the opportunity to segment risk 
over time? Conversely, if a policy (e.g., 
Medicare buy-in for early retirees) would 
divert individuals from the individual 
market, how would insurers respond?  
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